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NATURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
J. PATRICK KELLY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the decentralized international legal system, how should legal 
norms be formed?  The international system lacks a legislature with 
the authority to make law, an authoritative court with mandatory ju-
risdiction to articulate norms, an executive with delegated authority 
to make law or execute legal norms, or an international police force 
to enforce them.  Rather, under conventional theory, substantive in-
ternational law is largely consensual.  International law is formed by 
express consent in the case of treaty law and implied consent in the 
case of customary international law (CIL).1  A third source of law, 
general principles of law, provides procedural norms and doctrine to 
give effect to consensual norms.2 
With the exponential increase in the movement of goods, ser-
vices, capital, and people around the globe, there is ongoing pressure 
for predictable rules and regularized procedures to articulate norms 
and resolve disputes.  Concomitant with this trend has been the rise 
of consensual treaty regimes such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) that polices access to markets, the Ozone Layer Treaty re-
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business transactions and administrative law. 
 1. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (6th ed. 2003).  For 
a brief summary of the history of the triumph of positivism over natural law, see STEPHEN C. 
MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (2006). 
 2. For an extensive discussion of the sources of international law and their hierarchy, see 
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (2006).  For 
an argument that general principles of law should be used to inject subjectivity into interna-
tional law, see James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: 
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2030-34 
(2000) (book review). 
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gime that regulates the use of certain chemicals that threaten the pro-
tective function of the ozone layer, and other regimes designed to 
solve collective action problems and mitigate transboundary harms.3  
To what degree do these trends involve the mere application of prior 
agreed-upon positive norms and to what degree do these bodies ar-
ticulate new norms not legitimized by consent? 
International and domestic adjudicative bodies are increasingly 
turning away from consent as the basis of international legal norms 
and towards “Naturalism”4 to articulate binding legal norms.  The 
primary forms of Naturalism include both the expansive use of CIL 
and creative treaty interpretation beyond prior agreed-upon norms.5  
This turn toward Naturalism rather than consensual norms under-
mines fundamental values such as democratic legitimacy, national 
sovereignty, faithfulness in treaty interpretation6 and respect for local 
regulatory regimes and cultures.7 
Further, this rise of Naturalism is not accidental.  It reflects an 
underlying value struggle for dominance within the domestic polities 
of a few wealthy developed countries.  The different strains of 
thought may be characterized into two visions: Progressive Interna-
tionalists and State Power Rationalists.  Progressives are concerned 
that globalization, the pressure for efficiency, and regulatory competi-
tion among states have reduced the power of the State to implement 
social welfare legislation.  They would use the forms of law to raise 
concerns for environmental, labor, and health regulation to the inter-
 
 3. There is a significant literature demonstrating that international organizations are 
formed to solve collective action problems and produce more efficient outcomes.  See, e.g., 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through  Formal International Organiza-
tions, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4-5 (1998); JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005). 
 4. Here, “Naturalism” means the articulation of legal rules or principles extrinsic to posi-
tive enactment by the relevant political community.  The forms of Naturalism include the use of 
natural law, fundamental rights, constructivist norms, or, as discussed below, customary interna-
tional law in a manner beyond general state acceptance.  For a discussion of natural law ideas 
and their many sources, see Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro 
eds., 2002). 
 5. Dinah Shelton describes similar phenomena when she criticizes the tendency among 
writers and advocates to inflate the hierarchy of norms whereby “nonlaw becomes soft law, soft 
law becomes hard law.”  Shelton, supra note 2, at 322. 
 6. The Vienna Convention requires a textual approach in light of object and purpose.  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 7. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 
(2007) (proposing a pluralistic approach rather than territorial sovereigntism or universal har-
monization to resolve normative conflicts). 
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national level.  This view would internationalize the domestic regula-
tory and constitutional norms of secular, individualistic societies as in-
ternational rights.8  It idealizes international law as a restraint on state 
power and as a limit on transnational corporations. 
State Power Rationalists9 observe the rapid increase in globaliza-
tion and international organizations, but are concerned about the in-
herent reduction of state sovereignty.10  They view states as atomized 
individuals operating in an anarchic world and following only those 
rules they perceive in their self-interest.11  They idealize state power 
and see law as an instrumental mechanism to achieve their substan-
tive values.  For them, international law reflects the power of states 
and is facilitative, not restraining. 
Both positions mirror the classical tension in international law’s 
development of being both a reflection of western culture and an im-
perial project to universalize law regardless of participation or as-
sent.12 Naturalism is useful to each perspective. Naturalism bypasses 
 
 8. For examples, see the asserted transformation of U.S. tort law into international law in 
Trail Smelters Arbitration, infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text and the internationalization 
of the just compensation requirement of the 5th amendment of the U.S. Constitution through the 
Cordell Hull formulation of adequate, effective and prompt compensation for expropriation, 
infra note 37 and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712. 
 9. This term conflates at least two schools of thought asserting the primacy of state power 
over law.  The New Haven School of policy-oriented jurisprudence views international law as an 
authoritative process of decision-making by which states and other actors implement their 
common interests.  Claims by states with effective power create norms.  Despite this emphasis 
on effective power, actions must be in pursuit of postulated values associated with liberal de-
mocracies in order to be authoritative.  See Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Inter-
national Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103, 106 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).  A sec-
ond school of thought which might be characterized as rational self-interest consists of neo-
realists using game theory and other tools to demonstrate that international legal norms are 
non-binding conveniences among nations pursuing their individual self-interests.  See generally 
Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1404 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)). 
 10. Antonia and Abram Chayes describe the redefinition of sovereignty that they view as 
inherent in membership and participation in international organizations.  ABRAM CHAYES & 
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995).  This view clashes with the 
rational self-interest view of international law as non-binding conveniences among states that 
maximize state interests.  See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-14 (2005) [hereinafter LIMITS]. 
 11. See LIMITS, supra note 10, at 3-17; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral 
and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
115 (2002) (arguing that the presence of international legal and moral rhetoric is not inconsis-
tent with states merely pursuing their own self-interest). 
 12. International law defined relationships among European countries and established 
their authority to interact with or conquer non-European states and territories.  See generally 
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more democratic and difficult processes when success on policy is 
unlikely. The moral crusade of western universalism exhibited by the 
Bush administration’s war for democracy in Iraq shares much with 
the human rights mission. Both forms of Naturalism bypass positive 
law in their pursuit of their own vision of the good. Both ignore the 
different values and perspectives of most nations of the world. Prema-
ture international legalism in calling domestic norms international 
‘rights’ takes normative development and sensible tradeoffs out of the 
realm of both domestic and international politics. The premature 
touting of the values of a few wealthy western nations as international 
legal obligations rather than as part of a moral or policy discourse 
forces unattainable and, at times, inappropriate norms on developing 
countries.13 
This article will illustrate this trend toward Naturalism and ex-
plain its implications by providing a tour through the thicket of CIL, 
describing several recent WTO Appellate Body decisions grappling 
with the problem of normative development and examining the ide-
ology of human rights. Three central themes will emerge: the legiti-
macy of norm articulation, the presence of unresolved conflicts of 
values and interests finessed by Naturalism, and the inadequacy of in-
ternational lawmaking processes. 
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE CLAY OF 
NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
Customary international law has historically been the most im-
portant source of international norms.  Custom’s primacy is reflected 
in the understanding that treaties are considered binding because 
there is a prior customary norm, pacta sunt servanda, obligating na-
tions to observe treaties.14  CIL is said to be consensual based on state 
practice generally accepted as law.15  States impliedly consent to 
norms by their participation in state practice and their demonstrated 
attitude of acceptance.  Custom, then, consists of two elements: (1) 
 
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005) (describing the history of the European civilizing mission and its link to the international 
law concept of sovereignty and asking: who has sovereignty?, who grants it?, and who is denied 
it?). 
 13. See Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
International Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 379, 388-94 (2007). 
 14. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 216 (Max Knight trans., 1967); see J.L. 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 
51-56 (6th ed. 1963). 
 15. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
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the practice of states as the material element that provides evidence 
of customary norms and (2) the general acceptance of a norm as a le-
gal obligation by the world community as the attitudinal require-
ment.16  Yet much of international law is announced in books and ar-
ticles with little input from nations.  If one reads the international law 
literature, there is a rising tide of customary human right norms, envi-
ronmental norms, and jurisdictional limitations without nations either 
accepting these norms as legal obligations or participating in relevant 
state practice. 
Customary law, properly conceived, is empirical law.  Customary 
norms are binding because they are, in fact, accepted by all normal 
members of a society and are observable.17  Empirical acceptance is 
the touchstone.  Empirical acceptance, which has a certain popular 
democracy component, gives customary law its legitimacy.  Manda-
tory customary practices are found in all societies.  In traditional so-
cieties without separate legal institutions, longstanding practices are 
considered binding legal norms by its members and are enforced by 
informal means such as embarrassment, shunning, and, at times, ex-
clusion which may result in death.18  In modern societies, customary 
norms may become part of the legal system as implied terms in con-
tracts or may be considered mandatory social norms.  Even in ad-
vanced developed societies, mandatory social norms are enforced in 
cohesive communities, such as gypsy communities or cooperative 
ranching communities, extra-legally through a variety of coercive 
means.19 
CIL, however, has taken a different path.  Rather than the ac-
cepted law observable in practice, much of CIL is law articulated by 
scholars, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international 
jurists.  CIL has become law deduced from principles and instruments 
 
 16. ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-72 
(1971). 
 17. Customary law is a social fact subject to observation that the relevant community in-
vests with binding authority. See Ian Hamnett, Introduction to SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND 
LAW 7-8 (Ian Hamnett ed., 1977); MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE 
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 352 (1955). 
 18. See Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case 
of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L. J. 323, 353, 358-60 (1993). 
 19. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBOR’S SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (describing practices of Shasta County cattle ranchers with strong social norms 
to solve disputes and police nonconformists). 
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rather than legal norms inducted from observable fact.20  If the rele-
vant members of international society are nation-states, few partici-
pate in the formation of CIL and few have affirmatively accepted 
such norms as binding legal obligations.  Unlike traditional societies, 
nation-states are culturally diverse and have widely different histo-
ries, values, and interests.  This heterogeneity makes the essential re-
quirement of general acceptance, a necessity for custom’s legality and 
legitimacy, both unlikely and difficult to determine. Nor is it clear 
that implicit law is either necessary or wise as a method of lawmaking 
in the 21st century when international conferences are now common 
place, transportation is easy, and the internet provides instantaneous 
information. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable empirical evidence that na-
tions believe that some behavioral regularities are legally required.21  
The vast majority of nations have, for example, accepted the norm 
against torture as a binding legal obligation.22  Nations do not argue 
that torture is not a violation of international law, but rather they 
plead that a particular interrogation technique is not torture.23 
The modern paradigm of CIL is deceptively simple. CIL is 
formed by the general and consistent practices of states accepted by 
them as law.24  CIL binds all states.25  New members of the interna-
tional community of states are bound by existing customary law.26  
However, an existing state is not bound by emerging customary law if 
it persistently objects.27 All aspects of this paradigm are subject to de-
 
 20. For a summary of custom theory and the move toward deductive processes, see Anthea 
Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001). 
 21. For a list of examples, see ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 19-22 (1994).  For a theoretical explanation of why 
CIL may affect state behavior, see George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary Law 
Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005). 
 22. As of June, 2008 145 states were party to the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984), at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp. 
 23. The experience of the Department of State has been that no state asserts a right to tor-
ture. A state usually denies that it tortures or that the conduct is unauthorized or merely consti-
tutes rough treatment not torture. See Filartega v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 883-85 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(2) (1987). 
 25. Id. § 102 cmt. d. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The major treatises, as well as the U.S. Restatement, agree on the formal elements of 
this paradigm.  See, e.g., id.; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 6-12; OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL 
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bate.28 There is no common understanding of how to determine CIL 
beyond the ritualistic words of “general state practice accepted as 
law.” There are several significant problems with applying this con-
ception of law to international society. 
First, international society is composed of states with widely dif-
ferent values, perspectives, and interests spread throughout the globe.  
With few states participating in the limited acts of state practice, gen-
eralizations are suspect and often inaccurate.  Thus the few incidents 
of state practice relied on by theorists may reflect only a temporary 
convenience or a local custom rather than a generalized acceptance of 
a norm by an abstract international community.29 
Second, there is no agreement on what constitutes state practice.  
Do only physical actions such as repelling a ship from territorial wa-
ters count as state practice30 or do formal protests count to help pre-
vent the formation of CIL?31 
Third, how does one know if a norm has been generally ac-
cepted, the touchstone of normativity?  Does assent to a non-binding 
Declaration, such as the Stockholm or Rio Declarations, at an inter-
national conference or at the United Nations General Assembly indi-
cate general acceptance of the norm as law, or does it suggest only a 
concern about a vague goal? 
Fourth, is the source of CIL’s legal obligation common consent, 
i.e., consensus of states, or is it specific consent, express or implied?  
The reigning paradigm appears to bind new nations to prior custom-
ary norms because custom, once it is accepted by common consent, 
binds all universally.  Is this the case when a norm no longer com-
mands even a majority of states?  There is a hidden conundrum in 
customary theory: is CIL based on common consensus or consent, ex-
press or implied? While custom has historically been considered uni-
versal, the paradigm, as recently described in the western literature, 
permits a nation that persistently objects during the process of forma-
 
LAW 25-31 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. Addison Wesley Publ’g Co. 1996) 
(1905) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S]. 
 28. For a fuller discussion of the problems with the CIL paradigm, see generally J. Patrick 
Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000). 
 29. For four case studies of rules, traditionally described as CIL, that are better described 
as conveniences among a few states rather than generally accepted, see LIMITS, supra note 10, at 
45-78. 
 30. See D’AMATO, supra note 16, at 87-98. 
 31. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 
40 (1977). 
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tion to opt out of norms, suggesting a consent theory.32  This persis-
tent objector principle emerged after new nations became a majority 
at the United Nations and the west began to lose control over the de-
velopment of customary legal regimes particularly the protection of 
foreign investment.33  The effect of this incoherence is to make custom 
consensual for older nations and universally binding on new nations.  
States and advocates argue common consent to create norms and spe-
cific consent to opt out of norms. 
The methodology of customary international law is so malleable 
and undefined that both the left and right portions of the political 
spectrum in wealthy developed countries have little difficulty in ma-
nipulating its elements to advance their own normative agenda.34  
Progressive internationalists, including judges of the International 
Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, and the European 
Court of Human Rights, utilize general resolutions and treaties to 
promote their agenda of environmental and human rights norms.35  
On the right, scholars and unilateralists, operating under the theory 
that only physical acts count as state practice,36 use custom theory to 
promote rules to protect foreign investment37 and to promote a right 
 
 32. See OPPENHEIM’S, supra note 27, at 29. 
 33. See Kelly, supra note 28, at 508-16 (describing the history of the struggle between the 
consent and universal paradigms and the recent rise of the persistent objector principle). 
 34. For a summary of different perspectives, see Roberts, supra note 20. 
 35. See e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 241-43 (July 8). 
 36. For an application of this method to the claim of a unilateral right of the preemptive 
use of force, see W. Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim 
of Preemptive Self-defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525 (2006). 
 37. The norm of full compensation for expropriation is found in most treatises and the Re-
statement, but its pedigree is suspect.  Latin American nations opposed it from the beginning, 
and it has never commanded a broad consensus of nations.  In the classic incident in support of 
the principle of full compensation for expropriation, Mexico forcefully argued for national 
treatment in response to Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s assertion that the international mini-
mum standard required the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The cor-
respondence between Secretary Hull and the Mexican Ambassador is reproduced in 19 Dep’t of 
State, Press Releases 50-52, 136-37, 140, 143-44 (1938) For an extended discussion of the use of 
armed intervention and other strategies to impose the American and British view of the interna-
tional minimum standard on Latin American countries despite contrary national laws and dip-
lomatic protest, see CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN 
THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 37-64 (1985). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 188-90 (1965).  Within the 
domestic law of the United States, the protection of property has been characterized by a bal-
ancing of private compensation and public interest concerns.  See A.J. VAN DER WALT, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 8-16 (1997); Carol Rose, Property and Expropriation: 
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). 
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of unilateral intervention, humanitarian or otherwise.  Such a right is 
said to justify U.S. interventions in Iraq38, Grenada and Panama39 and 
Viet Nam’s takeover of Cambodia,40 all of which were contrary to the 
norm against the use of force in the U.N. Charter.41 Despite nearly 
unanimous condemnation by states, unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion has considerable resonance within the academy by both scholars 
on the right and left for different reasons.42 
Progressives use the Declarative Model43 of CIL to construct 
norms without their acceptance as legal norms by states.  The repeti-
tive iteration of norms such as the transboundary harm norm, origi-
nally articulated in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, in resolutions or dec-
larations at international fora is considered by many to indicate its 
acceptance as a norm of CIL.44  Confirmation of this point of view can 
be found in the U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations and the recent 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.45  The theory is 
that state assent to non-binding declarations at international confer-
ences or the United Nations General Assembly indicates acceptance 
of the norm as law and reinforces the arbitrator’s conclusion. 
 
 38. Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 36, at 538-44. 
 39. See Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 516, 523-24 (1990) (justifying the invasion of both Panama and Grenada 
arguing that although there is no principle of international law permitting intervention to im-
pose democracy on another state, international human rights law demands intervention against 
tyranny). 
 40. See FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 158, 199-200 (3d ed. 2005). 
 41. See INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 4, 8-9 
(W. Michael Reisman & Andrew Williard eds., 1988).  The Yale policy-oriented school of juris-
prudence associates authority with effective power and has had significant influence at the U.S. 
Department of State.  See W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, & Andrew R. Williard, The  
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 580 (2007). For a critique of 
this school as an apology for U.S. foreign policy, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEI, FROM APOLOGY TO 
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 173-78 (1989). 
 42. See, e.g., id.; TESON, supra note 40; W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of In-
ternational Action, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1995).  But see ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT 
C. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 135-36 (1993).  For a view from a third 
world perspective criticizing the intervention in Haiti for conditions that limit its humanitarian 
character, see Gathii, supra note 2, at 2051-53. 
 43. Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative Interna-
tional Law, 26 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 87, 89-90 (1991). 
 44. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 109 (2d ed. 2002) (“It is beyond serious argument that states are required by 
international law to take adequate steps to control and regulate sources of . . . transboundary 
harm within their territory”). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 
601 (1987); Legality of the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 243-44 (July 8). 
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The Declarative approach to normativity is suspect both from 
the empirical point of view and from the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy. By what authority does the repetition of non-binding 
norms, such as sustainable development, the precautionary principle, 
or the transboundary harm norm, in several declarations mutate into 
binding norms?  The arbitrator in Trail Smelter found no evidence of 
international state practice.46  Rather, he chose to assume that the in-
ternational law of transboundary air pollution was the same as United 
States law and then applied that law.47 The Stockholm Declaration 
and the subsequent Rio Declaration, which might be seen to reinforce 
the transboundary harm norm, are non-binding instruments that con-
tain qualifying and, indeed, contradictory language declaring that 
“States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources” 
according to their own environmental and developmental policies.48  
Indeed, there is little empirical evidence that states accept it as norm.  
The Trail Smelter in Canada, itself, continues to pour sulfur dioxide 
into the atmosphere.49  The United States produces acid rain that 
drifts into Canada.  If nations, in fact, accept them as binding, then 
one would expect nations to have the political will to enter a binding 
treaty. 
Similarly, the universalizing of limited incidents of state practice 
of powerful nations by scholars on the right and the Bush administra-
tion reifies power at the expense of democratic legitimacy.50 A few in-
cidents of highly contested state practice are treated as creating new 
exceptions to general norms despite widespread protest.51 This meth-
odology redefines customary law in a manner that minimizes the es-
sential legitimizing element of custom, the general acceptance of the 
community. It encourages confrontation and the unilateral use of 
 
 46. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-64 (Mixed Arb. Trib. 1938, 
1941). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 
(June 14, 1992). 
 49. For a description of the history, see DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 504-11 (2d ed. 2002). 
 50. One example of a universalized limited incident is the humanitarian intervention by 
NATO to halt “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia.  See Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s 
Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828 (1999) (discussing NATO’s humanitarian inter-
vention in Yugoslavia). 
 51. For an example of such a contested state practice, see ABA Committee on Grenada, 
International Law and the United States Action in Grenada, 18 INT’L LAW. 331, 375 n.107 (1984) 
(describing formal votes against intervention at both the United Nations Security Council and 
General Assembly). 
KELLY_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:22:18 PM 
2008] NATURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 405 
force rather than political and legal processes to solve disputes, mak-
ing international law an undemocratic exercise with little persuasive 
authority. 
Consider that there is a class of CIL norms that exhibit regularity 
of behavior and are asserted by nearly all nations as legally required.  
The list, while a short one, provides a narrative through the painful 
journey of our civilization’s attempt to confront its own inhumanity.  
The prohibitions against genocide, slavery, ethic cleansing, torture 
and, arguably, the juvenile death penalty are nearly universally ac-
cepted as legal norms.52  The norm against the use of force in Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter53 is both universally accepted and 
its violation challenged.54  The bombing in Kosovo, the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the genocide in Darfur challenge legal 
theory precisely because the norm against the use of force is neces-
sary for civilization and its prosperity.  Yet exceptions may be neces-
sary to secure the values of life and human dignity that are fundamen-
tal to civilization.55 
If much of CIL scholarship promises too much through prema-
ture legalism, the new rational self-interest school promises too little.  
In the Limits of International Law,56 Professors Goldsmith and Posner 
challenge the more classical accounts of international lawmaking.  
They argue that CIL, which they describe as behavioral regularity 
among states, is better explained by rational self-interest than fidelity 
to legal obligation.57  Their descriptive account of four models of ra-
tional self-interest is then used to support their normative project of 
eliminating legal restraints on state behavior.  In this view, interna-
tional norms, whether customary or treaty norms, are not restraints, 
but mere conveniences for pursuing self-interest.  State power is ide-
alized and will is reified by eliminating law.  Violations of CIL, such 
as the norm against torture, or of treaties, such as the U.N. Charter or 
 
 52. See David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
11-13 (2006) (noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, which made the juve-
nile death penalty unconstitutional based, in part, on international law and state practice). 
 53. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 54. In the Nicaragua case, the United States argued that this norm was jus cogens.  
Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 2 I.C.J. Pleadings 95 (Aug. 17, 1984). 
 55. For one attempt to explain actions that are accepted by a majority of states, even 
though they are contrary to Article 2(4), as illegal but legitimate, see Wedgwood, supra note 50, 
at 829. 
 56. LIMITS, supra note 10. 
 57. Id. at 26, 39. 
KELLY_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:22:18 PM 
406 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:395 
the WTO Agreement, are justified because such norms do not create 
binding legal obligations, only opportunities to coordinate self-
interest. 
This “minimalist realist” approach58 does provide a powerful, and 
at times compelling, description of state behavior in international re-
lations and of state motivation in entering CIL and treaty regimes.  
Detailed case studies do demonstrate that many custom regimes in-
volve relatively few players and were not, in fact, universal at the 
time.  Treatises written in English, for example, created a simplified 
view of the law of the territorial sea because of unfamiliarity with the 
practice and the literature of non-English speaking cultures or per-
haps out of sympathy for the policy positions of Great Britain and the 
United States.59 
There is no necessary relationship, however, between Goldsmith 
and Posner’s descriptive account and their normative view that inter-
national law is not binding.  Their assessment that several CIL norms 
are best seen as temporary conveniences between a few states for a 
period of time would lend support to an entirely different assessment 
that few putative norms of CIL have been generally accepted, not 
that no norms are legally binding.60 Whether a particular norm is ac-
cepted and universally binding is a question of fact. 
Goldsmith and Posner view self-interest as an alternative to legal 
obligation rather than its explanation.  But these are not mutually ex-
clusive.61  Self-interest does not negate obligation. It explains why it is 
undertaken. The centripetal forces encouraging participation in the 
WTO regime include long-term reciprocity and wealth maximization 
as well as a short term political agenda to respond to lobbying from 
pharmaceuticals and other high technology firms to preserve their in-
tellectual property. 
Self-interest, whether narrow and short-term or long-term based 
on mutual reciprocity, may be the primary explanation for entering 
binding commitments.  In creating the WTO, nations negotiated bind-
ing agreements and developed a mandatory adjudicatory system with 
sanctioned retaliation as a remedy, in part, because the payoffs from 
long-term reciprocal limits on their behavior would maximize their 
 
 58. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 9, at 1421 n.41. 
 59. See, e.g., LIMITS, supra note 10, at 59-66. 
 60. For an attempt to demonstrate that, even under rational theory, CIL does affect state 
behavior through self-interest, see Norman & Trachtman, supra note 21. 
 61. “[I]n international law . . . the law is primarily consent-based and therefore utility seek-
ing and law-abiding behavior is often identical.”  Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 9, at 1442. 
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mutual interest over time. 62  Binding obligations that restrain state 
behavior are a necessary part of achieving state goals.63  The norma-
tive conclusion that international law is a temporary convenience 
when applied to treaty regimes, rather than preserving self-interest, 
would severely undermine the ability of the United States to achieve 
longer term goals of open markets, protection for intellectual prop-
erty rights, and nuclear non-proliferation, all of which require collec-
tive action. Without a sense of obligation these goals are fragile. 
All of these approaches to CIL have some resonance because 
there is little agreement on how to construct CIL norms.  Much of 
CIL is ‘Naturalist’ lawmaking, not empirical law.  If we take the gen-
eral acceptance requirement seriously, it will be quite difficult to form 
legitimate substantive customary norms in a world of many different 
cultures, values, and perspectives.  General acceptance must be taken 
seriously because without it, CIL lacks authority and legitimacy. This 
norm inflation problem is not confined to CIL.  To paraphrase Dinah 
Shelton, looking at the literature and claims by states and advocates, 
non-law becomes soft law, soft law becomes hard CIL, and CIL and 
treaty norms become jus cogens.64 
Moreover, the creative approaches to CIL are not necessary in 
an era of rapid transportation and communications.  If there is, in 
fact, the political will to accept international legal norms, then binding 
treaties are possible.  If there is not the political will, then the impe-
rial project is recast with little understanding of its implications.  CIL 
is the preferred technique for normative scholars and judges precisely 
because there are unresolved conflicts over values that cannot be 
bridged. 
II. NATURALISM IN WTO ADJUDICATION 
The second form of “Naturalism” in international law formation 
that is inhibiting political debate and wise policy-making is norm ex-
pansion through judicial activism within treaty regimes.  The forma-
tion of the World Trade Organization (WTO)65 in 1995 inaugurated a 
new era of compulsory judicial-like settlement of trade disputes.  
 
 62. For the position that WTO rules help governments resist domestic political pressure for 
protectionism and thereby promote freer trade and democracy, see John McGiness & Mark 
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 515 (2000). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Shelton, supra note 2, at 322. 
 65. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. 
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Prior to the WTO’s establishment, disputes were solved by diplomatic 
negotiation or the submission of disputes to GATT panels where par-
ticipation was voluntary.66  The GATT agreement itself contained a 
detailed set of rules that required reciprocal access to markets,67 na-
tional treatment for imported products68 and a series of exceptions to 
permit legitimate health and safety laws.69  Under the new WTO sys-
tem, participation in GATT panels is mandatory and a new Appellate 
Body (AB) is empowered to review decisions of expert panels for fi-
delity to WTO law.70  This creates the opportunity for AB judges to 
make law through interpretation, even though the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), the agreement regulating the authority and 
process of dispute settlement, severely curtails the discretion of the 
AB in lawmaking.71 
The debate at the WTO, however, has been between those who 
view the regime as essentially contractual, and those who would in-
corporate other norms—including a wider body of CIL norms such as 
the putative precautionary principle—to trump previously negotiated 
treaty norms.72  Environmentalists and progressives would expand the 
range of social policies that might justify limits on the treaty right to 
market access.73  This debate may be seen as a struggle between dif-
ferent interest groups in the west—environmental and labor activists 
on the one hand, and multilateral corporations on the other—for pol-
icy dominance.74 This debate, however, has generally ignored the 
 
 66. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947, art. XXII, XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 67. Id. art. I. 
 68. Id. art. III. 
 69. Id. art. XX. 
 70. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
arts. 17, 19, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. 
      71.    The DSU cautions the AB in Art. 3.2 that the purpose of the dispute settlement system 
is “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements” and that 
rulings “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agree-
ments.” DSU, supra note 70 art. 3.2 (emphasis added). 
 72. See David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 
AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 406-7 (1998). 
 73. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689 
(1998). 
 74. A two-level intergovernmentalist approach sees the preferences of domestic interest 
groups affecting state positions in international negotiations.  See GARETH PORTER, JANET 
WALSH BROWN & PAMELA S. CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 37-40 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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DSU requirement that dispute settlement interpretation must not 
modify rights nor “impair benefits accruing to  . . . member[s] under 
[the] agreements.”75  From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, it 
also marginalizes the views and interests of developing countries and, 
at times, even developed countries. 
This battle has been fought on two fronts.  In some cases, there 
has been a direct attempt to introduce a non-GATT norm as a rule of 
decision into adjudication to modify a GATT right. Advocates of 
Naturalist interpretations have been more successful introducing ex-
trinsic norms as interpretive material illuminating the “ordinary 
meaning” of provisions in the agreements.  In the European Beef 
Hormones case,76 the European Community (EC) had banned the 
import of meat and meat products from farm animals treated with 
certain growth hormones.77 In order to ban food products, the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment) requires that member nations must do a risk assessment78 and 
base any restriction on scientific evidence.79  The rationale for the EC 
Hormone Directive had been that consumption of meat from such 
animals was dangerous.80  The World Health Organization, however, 
had determined that such hormones were safe for human consump-
tion, and the European Community could offer no scientific evidence 
of harm.81  The EC also argued that the Directive was based on the 
precautionary principle, which it termed to be a rule of customary in-
ternational law that justified the measure despite the requirements of 
the SPS.82  The AB made no judgment about the status of the precau-
tionary principle as CIL, but did conclude that since it was not written 
 
 75. DSU, supra note 70 art. 3.5. 
 76. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter 
Beef Hormone Report]. 
 77. Id. ¶¶ 2-6. 
 78. Id. ¶ 179 (citing Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 5.1, Apr. 4, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal In-
struments - Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493, 33 I.L.M. 1128 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]). 
 79. Id. ¶ 173 (citing SPS Agreement, supra note 78 art. 3.3); see also id. ¶ 187 (citing SPS 
Agreement, supra note 78 art. 5.2). 
 80. Id. ¶¶ 26-29. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 206-08. 
 82. Id. ¶ 121. The EC argument was that the precautionary principle permitted members to 
evaluate risk in a variety of ways. 
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into the SPS Agreement, it did not override the negotiated principles 
requiring a risk assessment and scientific evidence.83 
While at a formal level extrinsic norms have been excluded, CIL 
and extrinsic treaty norms have been used to interpret WTO terms, 
infusing them with new meaning. The limits of consent have been 
tested in a series of environmental conservation cases beginning with 
the Tuna/Dolphin litigation84 under the more voluntary GATT dis-
pute settlement system and culminating with the Shrimp/Sea Turtle 
litigation85 under the mandatory WTO dispute system. In the 
Tuna/Dolphin cases, GATT panels had found that U.S. regulations 
that prohibited the importation of tuna captured beyond the territo-
rial waters of the U.S. in a manner that killed more dolphin than 
permitted violated Article XI as a non-tariff barrier to imports.86  In 
doing so, they held that the general exception in Articles XX(b) for 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,” and in XX(g), “relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources” did not apply.87  The measure was not ‘necessary’ 
because there were other methods more consistent with GATT obli-
gations such as multilateral negotiations and labeling that could be 
used to resolve the problem.88  The GATT panel also found that the 
measures did not qualify under XX(g) because it was primarily aimed 
at conservation and such measures could not be applied extraterrito-
rially.89  A nation may regulate the products that enter its jurisdiction, 
but, according to the decision, not how they are caught or produced 
abroad—the so-called process/production distinction.90  The cases en-
gendered much critical comment from environmentalists and lead to 
massive demonstrations and riots at WTO ministerial meetings plac-
 
 83. Id. ¶¶ 123-25. 
 84. Report of the Panel, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 
(Sept. 3, 1991) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Report]; Report of the Panel, United States–
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (not adopted). 
 85. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Appellate Report]. 
 86. Tuna Report, supra note 84, ¶ 7.1(a). 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 5.29, 5.34. 
 88. Id. ¶ 5.28. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 5.30-5.34. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 5.9-5.16. 
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ing considerable pressure on the organization and several state mem-
bers.91 
In the Shrimp/Sea Turtle case, the new Appellate Body (AB) of 
the WTO reexamined these issues and used an “evolutionary meth-
odology” to expand the conservation exception for “exhaustible natu-
ral resources” in Article XX(g) to include living as well as inanimate 
resources.92  There is considerable evidence that at the time natural 
resources referred to inanimate minerals and commodities, such as 
oil, that could not reproduce in distinction to living creatures that 
were protected under the Article XX(b) human, animal or plant life 
or health exception.93  Rather than seek to determine the meaning of 
the text at the time or the intent of the negotiators, the AB said that 
Article XX(g) must be interpreted in light of the contemporary con-
cerns of the international community.94  It upheld a unilateral U.S. 
ban on imported shrimp caught in foreign waters in a manner con-
trary to U.S. law, but found that the measure was applied in a dis-
criminatory manner.95 It is important to understand that the United 
States was banning a product, not because of defects in the product 
itself, which would be permissible, but because it objected to how the 
shrimp were caught within the territorial waters of Thailand.  That is, 
the United States was using the lever of market access to prescribe 
environmental policy within Thailand.  While the goal of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act is the laudatory one of preserving threatened 
species, it was not a health or safety issue for consumers in the United 
States. 
The decision appears to be quite broad, permitting unilateral 
bans of products produced in a manner contrary to one nation’s envi-
ronmental policy.  In many ways, the AB should be applauded for 
their candor in openly using an “evolutionary” method of interpreta-
 
 91. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and 
the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. 
ENV. L. REV. 1, 1 nn1-2 (2001). 
 92. Shrimp Appellate Report, supra note 85, ¶¶ 129-30. 
 93. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Seduction of the Appellate Body: Shrimp/Sea Turtle I and II 
and the Proper Role of States in WTO Governance, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 478-80 (2005). 
 94. Shrimp Appellate Report, supra note 85, ¶ 129. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 184-87.  The United States subsequently modified its procedure to eliminate the 
discriminatory treatment, and the AB upheld the measure and its application as consistent with 
the agreements.  Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 3, 153-54, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
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tion96 rather than hiding their policy choice, as is often done, behind 
opaque textualism.  Nevertheless, it ignored the original meaning of 
the parties as expressed in the documents, past GATT decisions and 
the declared positions of the vast majority of nations. 
Objections to this decision are discussed in depth elsewhere.97  
The core concerns are, first, that the “evolutionary methodology” the 
AB utilized is inconsistent with the structure of governance in the 
WTO agreements and the interpretive methodology of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties that is required by the DSU.98  
The WTO is essentially a contractual regime where nations negotiate 
specific norms and standards.  The agreement establishing the WTO 
describes a state-centered contractual treaty regime with lawmaking 
authority residing in the Ministerial Council, not the AB.99  Second, 
the original meaning of the Article XX(g) exception was to protect 
commodities such as oil that could be depleted, not living creatures 
which were protected under the Article XX(b) exception for  human, 
animal or plant life or health.100  Article XX(b) wisely contains a “nec-
essary” requirement as a filter for protectionist uses of this exception.  
Third, nearly all nations, including the United States, had opposed a 
broad conservation exception and had voted at the Uruguay Round 
to move a similar proposal to the Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment (CTE) to die a quiet death, which it did.101 
 
 96. For the AB’s discussion of its evolutionary methodology, see Shrimp Appellate Report, 
supra note 85, ¶¶ 129-30. 
 97. Kelly, supra note 93, at 486-87.  Recognizing that the AB is unlikely to fully reverse its 
position, the author proposes that article XX(g) be limited to an emergency exception for en-
dangered species. 
 98. DSU Article 3.2 directs the settlement bodies to both preserve the rights and obliga-
tions of members under the various covered agreements and “to clarify the existing provisions 
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law.” The Appellate Body has interpreted “customary rules of public international law” to refer 
to the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. See WTO Appellate Body Re-
port, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS 8,10,11/AB/R, at 9 (Oct. 4, 1996) (conclud-
ing that the rules of interpretation in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention had attained the 
status of rules of customary international law and would be applied). The DSU, establishing the 
terms of WTO mandatory dispute settlement, further cautions the AB that “[a]ll solutions to 
matters formally raised under the . . . dispute settlement provisions of the covered agree-
ments . . . shall be consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits ac-
cruing to any Member under those agreements.”  DSU, supra note 70 art. 3.5. 
 99. See Final Act, supra note 65 arts. IX and X. 
 100. Kelly, supra note 93, at 478-80. 
 101. For the history of the CTE’s creation and its usefulness in deferring a broad conserva-
tion exception, see Gregory C. Shaffer, “If only we were Elephants”: The Political Economy of 
the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
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More importantly, even if we assume, contrary to the DSU, that 
the AB does have the authority to engage in this type of broad “evo-
lutionary” interpretation, it is apparent that this methodology was be-
ing used as a form of the Naturalist approach to lawmaking, not a 
search for community consensus.  The AB did not engage in an em-
pirical or even systematic investigation to determine the contempo-
rary community’s concerns about this issue. 
In determining the contemporary concerns of the international 
community about the conservation of endangered species, the AB did 
not rely on the most relevant treaty, the Convention on the Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), for guidance.102  CITES seriously limits international regula-
tion of how a nation treats endangered species within its own terri-
tory, leaving such regulation to the sovereign prerogative of each na-
tion.103  Rather, the AB placed great reliance on non-WTO sources104 
and the preamble of the 1994 WTO Agreement, explicitly acknowl-
edging the broad, undefined norm of sustainable development as one 
of the many objectives of the WTO regime.105  The preamble of the 
WTO Agreement, for example, does not raise environmental con-
cerns above others.106  The Preamble actually includes primarily eco-
nomic objectives, such as raising living standards in developing coun-
tries and growth in income, production and employment.107  The one-
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 349, 357-59 AND 386-87 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. 
Southwick eds., 2002). 
 102. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES] (entered into force July 1, 1975).  
There are 172 parties to CITES as of 2008.  See CITES Secretariat, List of Parties, 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
 103. See CITES, supra note 102, arts. II-IV, XIII. 
 104. For a similar, although more technical, use of non-WTO materials to inform the mean-
ing of WTO terms in the WTO Biotech Panel Report, see Margaret A. Young, The WTO’s Use 
of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
907 (2007). 
 105. Shrimp Appellate Report, supra note 85, ¶¶ 129-131. 
 106. See Final Act, supra note 65 pmbl. 
 107. Id., cl. 1. The relevant clause states: 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development . . . . 
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hundred word, internally inconsistent preamble gives no guidance on 
how these general and conflicting mass of goals and concerns are to 
be reconciled.108 
The AB’s selective use of a small portion of the preamble pro-
vides it with the unfettered discretion to choose the policy concern in 
the preamble that supported its policy choice.  It could just as well 
have referred to language in the preamble to justify the opposite con-
clusion because the measure would close members’ borders to devel-
oping countries’ products, shrink employment and economic growth 
in the Thai shrimp industry, and interfere with rather than preserve 
the objectives of the trading system.109 
The AB’s misuse of the “evolutionary” interpretation methodol-
ogy illustrates the dangers of the Naturalist approach.  The “evolu-
tionary interpretation” methodology provides the means for judges to 
expand exceptions and other norms when there is no community 
agreement or consensus.  The AB’s interpretive methodology raises 
fundamental issues of global governance.  Implicit is the premise that 
major substantive policy issues not negotiated by Member States in 
treaty regimes may, nevertheless, be decided by judicial panels be-
yond state consent. 
The AB’s judicial activism not only disenfranchises developing 
countries from important international policymaking; it also, as a 
practical matter, diminishes the ability of least developed countries 
(LDCs) to determine their own environmental policies within their 
territory.  A treaty designed to promote market access by reducing 
tariffs and eliminating non-tariff barriers was interpreted by its own 
judicial body to permit a nation to unilaterally deny access to its mar-
ket and increase the production costs of competitor nations unless 
such nations adopt their preferred environmental policies. 
 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id., cl. 1. : 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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The decision and its use of the evolutionary methodology re-
moved environmental and potentially other social policy from both 
international and domestic politics where costs and benefits could be 
debated.  Instead, in a world of many different interests and levels of 
economic development, important policy decisions on the appropriate 
balance of environmental protection and economic development are 
left to the vagaries of the domestic political arena of those nations 
with the market power to impose their view. 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AS IDEOLOGY 
While many international human rights norms are legally binding 
norms to be celebrated, there is imbedded in recent international le-
gal theory the view that international norms are an expression of uni-
versal rights that apply regardless of national boundaries or political 
choice by domestic majorities.110  These norms are said to be binding 
without state consent or domestic democratic processes.  Jed 
Rubenfeld terms this conception “international constitutionalism” 
because these rights are determined by international judges or ex-
perts irrespective of democratic politics.111  This underlying normative 
structure is then expressed by the use of traditional sources that re-
veal these fundamental norms.  Sometimes this argument is made as a 
form of CIL, as discussed above, such as the claim by scholars that 
many of the norms in the non-binding Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights are now generally accepted as CIL.112 
Universal norms are also revealed through interpretation of con-
sensual treaties in a manner that expands the norms beyond any in-
tended bargain.  Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, which prohibits “cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment” has been declared to 
prohibit the death penalty, caning, and other forms of physical pun-
ishment even though these punishments are widely permitted within 
domestic legal systems and many, if not a majority of nations in the 
 
 110. For a discussion of this approach, see Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspi-
ration, Reality and Prospect, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 5, 11 (Samantha Power & Gra-
ham Allison eds., 2000).  For an argument that fundamental human rights are general principles 
of law to be applied by courts, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights 
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 102-06 (1988-89). 
 111. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1999 
(2004). 
 112. See e.g., Hurst Hannam, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289, 322-32 (1995-96). 
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case of the death penalty, would not accept such limits on their pre-
rogatives.  What a given society considers as “cruel or inhuman” may, 
in some circumstances, be a question of perception affected by cul-
ture and religious beliefs. Agreement on the interpretation of a gen-
eral standard of human rights like “cruel or inhuman” is unlikely 
without an extended dialogue among cultures.113 
Similarly, Article 1 of The Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women prohibits discrimination 
that “has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.”114  The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the treaty body estab-
lished to review national reports and make recommendations, de-
clared that female circumcision was a gender-based form of violence 
and that states may be responsible even for private acts if they fail to 
act with due diligence.115  The Committee determined that reserva-
tions based on traditional, cultural or religious practices are incom-
patible with the convention and should be withdrawn.116  Even though 
female genital mutilation (FGM) or female circumcision may be ab-
horrent and injurious to health, it is not clear that it is a form of dis-
crimination that violates the Convention when the participants 
(women and young girls) believe that this traditional practice is a con-
stituent part of their culture.117  Nor is it necessarily either a treaty or 
customary norm when fifty-three nations that did sign the Convention 
entered reservations for religious or cultural reasons.118 
 
 113. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining Interna-
tional Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 37-39 (1992). 
 114. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 1, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 115. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW], General Rec-
ommendation No. 19: Violence against Women, ¶¶ 9, 11, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992). 
 116. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General  on the Status of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Annex X, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/318 (1998) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report]. 
 117. For a survey of the diversity of views on this controversial subject, see Hope Lewis, Be-
tween Irua and “Female Genital Mutilation”: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural 
Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995). 
 118. The CEDAW Committee in analyzing the many reservations indicated that traditional 
or religious beliefs do not justify violations and offered its view that such reservations were in-
compatible with the Convention and should be withdrawn.  Secretary-General Report, supra 
note 116, Annex X, ¶¶ 11, 24. 
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Similarly, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 
has on several occasions demonstrated that it views human rights as 
universal beyond state consent.  One may observe that the U.S. gov-
ernment uses the ICCPR as a sword against other countries while 
submitting reservations, declarations, and understandings to its ratifi-
cation that effectively preclude undertaking any significant interna-
tional legal obligation.119  Nevertheless, the Human Rights Commit-
tee, in rejecting the U.S. reservations as unacceptable, revealed that it 
regarded human rights as universal obligations beyond the normal 
exchange of obligations through consensual treaty law.120 
These techniques of universalizing rights beyond politics are, of 
course, not just the province of progressives.  The Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, for example, proclaims 
that the standard of full compensation for expropriation of foreign in-
vestment is not subject to change by a majority of nations.121  The 
Bush administration propounds a right to democracy as justification 
for selective military intervention to vindicate this right.  Both the 
pedigree and content of such a right are open to question.122 
The point is not to approve or disapprove of the death penalty, 
female genital mutilation, a right to democracy or any specific norm, 
but to raise the issue of which system of law, international or domes-
tic, should make these determinations and by what processes. The 
universal theory of human rights applied by many judges and practi-
tioners is, in many circumstances, inconsistent with the consent theory 
of international law and democratic governance within domestic so-
cieties. Indeed, it precludes pluralism in normative development.  
Many societies, for example, are already moving to prohibit or modify 
FGM. 
 
 119. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 341, 342 (1995). 
 120. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 279, U.N. Doc. 
A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995). 
 121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 711-13 (1987). 
 122. For a summary of the arguments for and against a right to democracy, see Gregory H. 
Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for 
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6-16 (Greg-
ory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  Even in his classic argument for a right to a democratic 
form of government, Thomas Franck warns that such a democratic entitlement should be de-
linked from the unilateral use of military force to compel compliance.  Thomas M. Franck, The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 84 (1992). 
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One of the manifestations of Naturalism in human rights devel-
opment is found in the rise of transnational litigation of human rights 
in domestic courts under the notions of universal jurisdiction or tran-
sitory torts.123  Litigation under the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA)124 
of the United States permits claims and decisions based on a universal 
jurisprudence beyond state consent or democratic choice.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court faced this problem of human rights overreach in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain125 and decided to limit cognizable claims to norms 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity.126  This 
decision appears to limit ATCA claims to a narrow class of clear con-
sensus human rights claims that is more reflective of a positivist 
rather than universalist framework.127 
An interesting example that may portend a move toward positiv-
ist norms in human rights litigation is the ongoing litigation in New 
York to collect damages from businesses profiting from doing busi-
ness with South Africa during the apartheid era.128 While there may be 
a compelling moral basis to at least some claims in the suit, the inde-
pendent South Africa government strenuously opposes the suit be-
cause it undermines their domestic process of reconciliation.  After 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s dis-
missal of the complaint, the Republic of South Africa issued a state-
ment stating that the case impinged on its sovereignty and should be 
resolved through South Africa’s own democratic process.129  The 
Court of Appeals significantly trimmed back the claims before re-
manding to the district court indicating a new attitude to the more 
creative claims and leaving open the possibility that all claims will be 
dismissed as involving a non-justiciable political question involving 
 
 123. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet 
Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 129, 132-33 (2000). 
 124. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 126. Id. at 725. 
 127. Id. at 729, 731-33. The court appeared to adopt a consensual rather than universal 
framework when it said, “courts should require any [ATCA] claim based on the present-day law 
of nations to rest on a norm  of international character accepted by the civilized world and de-
fined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigm[].”  Id. at 725. 
 128. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 129. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007) (Kor-
man, J. dissenting). 
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significant foreign policy considerations that require deference to the 
political branches.130 
Expanding human rights in a manner contrary to non-western 
cultural values, or undermining domestic solutions to promote social 
cohesion in a divided South Africa, raises issues both of the legiti-
macy of the project and its practical utility when it engenders wide-
spread opposition rather than compliance.  Differences in values, in 
many circumstances, might better be characterized as moral dialogue 
rather than as legal imperatives.  In labeling traditional practices as 
illegal, rather than a moral issue within a social context, shuts down 
dialogue that could inform both perspectives.  The FGM debate con-
flates harm with ritual.  A more pluralistic and modest approach 
might encourage an evolution away from practices that produce un-
desirable health effects and personal autonomy concerns and toward 
a more symbolic ritual. Any expansion beyond a core of negative 
freedoms (freedom from government interference with personal 
autonomy and the electoral process) has and may continue to degen-
erate into cultural imperialism.131 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
The link between state consent and international norm develop-
ment is increasingly attenuated.  As international institutions prolif-
erate and judicial bodies expand their province, international obliga-
tions are being created and authoritative decisions being made 
beyond domestic democratic processes. All forms of “Naturalism” 
discussed above (the misuse of malleable CIL, norm inflation, “evolu-
tionary” or expansive interpretation of treaty regimes, and the adop-
tion of a universal ideology of rights by domestic and international 
tribunals) diminish democratic decision-making and politics.  This 
lack of democratic legitimacy is particularly true with regard to LDCs 
who may have little input into norm development and lack the power 
or influence to significantly affect the outcome. 
Democratic values will be enhanced by decreasing reliance on 
CIL as a legitimate source of substantive legal norms.  Few substan-
tive CIL norms have a legitimate pedigree as law.  Environmental 
principles, such as sustainable development or the precautionary 
principle, articulated as law in much of the literature, may be wise 
 
 130. Id. at 152-53; see also Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 259-60; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. 
 131. For an extended argument for this position, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001). 
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policy guides, but they are inappropriate as legal norms.  Sustainable 
development is a useful concept for organizing one’s thinking about 
how to allocate resources to minimize harm and maximize the avail-
ability of resources for the future; however, policy actions to imple-
ment sustainable development inherently impose costs and require 
tradeoffs with other worthy goals that should be the province of the 
legislative processes of international legal regimes and domestic legis-
latures rather than jurists.132  The Shrimp/Sea Turtle case, for example, 
illustrates how broad, undefined norms such as sustainable develop-
ment could be used by the judiciary to trump democratic compro-
mises between environmental concerns and economic development. 
The legitimacy of international law would be improved by 
greater use of consensual treaties and treaty regimes.  Treaty regimes, 
as a general matter, permit greater participation, more efficient solu-
tions, and a level of commitment to norms. Participation and com-
mitment will enhance compliance and permit a wider variety of policy 
tools and more efficient, less costly outcomes.133  There is nascent 
framework of policy instruments both domestically and internation-
ally to expand economic opportunity rather than rely only on tradi-
tional welfare approaches and command and control regulation. In 
the United States, there is, as a matter of fiscal necessity, a rise of 
market-based environmental tools, such as the cap-and-trade system 
for SO2, which stimulate innovation and encourage efficient produc-
tion.  The WTO, the Montreal Protocols, and the Kyoto Protocols all, 
to some degree, utilize market-based regulatory techniques to achieve 
better, more efficient solutions to transboundary harms or benefits. 
The substantive values of democracy, individual rights and secu-
larism are western in origin and may have limited resonance in many 
societies.  Other cultures do value and respect a measure of individual 
autonomy, but may give primacy or balance with communitarian val-
ues.  When environmental and human values are conceived of as 
rights, there is little room for pluralism.  The attempt in Iraq to im-
 
 132. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 223-28 (1999) (ex-
plaining that all rights have costs in terms of government supervision and private remedial costs 
and are inherently limited, not absolute). 
 133. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
579, 581-82 (2005) (arguing that design elements—hard law, dispute settlement mechanisms and 
monitoring—increase the costs of treaty violations enhancing the probability of compliance); see 
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 493 (2005) (arguing that treaty commitments increase the likelihood of 
compliance and vice versa); see also Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1821 (2003). 
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pose formal democracy on people with different values and loyalties 
is reminiscent of an earlier era of American adventurism justified by 
abstract values.  In Shrimp/Sea Turtle, the AB interpreted a consen-
sual agreement to take away the fundamental right of market access 
by permitting wealthy nations to impose their environmental values 
on poorer societies if they want to sell their products.  Premature in-
ternational legalism134 takes normative development and sensible 
trade-offs out of the realm of both international and domestic politics 
without the necessary political deliberation.  Environmental and even 
human rights have costs both in financial resources and political re-
sources that should be assessed along with competing claims in the 
political arena. 
The move away from consent reduces the legitimacy of interna-
tional law, which is already handicapped by inadequate enforcement.  
Normative policy-making diminishes acceptance and may discourage 
compliance.  International law has been a means of domination; 
through greater use of ongoing treaty regimes, it has the capacity to 




 134. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
